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The Logic behind Thomas Aquinas’s Predication Thesis, 
Esse Substantiale, and Esse in Rerum Natura
Elliot Polsky
Abstract: Thomistic commentators agree that Thomas Aquinas at least nominal-
ly allows for “to be” (esse) to signify not only an act contrasted with essence in 
creatures, but also the essence itself of those creatures. Nevertheless, it is almost 
unheard of for any author to interpret Thomas’s use of the word “esse” as referring 
to essence. Against this tendency, this paper argues that Thomas’s In V Metaphysics 
argument that every predication signifies esse provides an important instance of 
Thomas using “esse” to signify essence. This reading of In V Metaphysics, which this 
paper defends against Gyula Klima’s alternative interpretation, suggests significant 
reinterpretations of Thomas’s technical terms “esse substantiale” and “esse in rerum 
natura” as well as Thomas’s use of “is,” both as a copula and as a principal predicate.
Most1 philosophers today, Thomists included, think that understand-ing words, like “existence” or “to be” (esse), is peculiarly connected to understanding what are today called “existential propositions.”2 
These are propositions loosely characterized by either having “is” or “exists” as 
the principal predicate or being equivalent to ones in which “is” is the principal 
predicate. Thus, these authors tend to develop their understanding of existence or 
esse from their interpretation of the predicate “is” as either reducible to some other 
predicate or irreducible.3 This contemporary debate greatly obscures Thomas’s own 
understanding of being and predication. In In V Metaphysics, Thomas comments on 
a text from Aristotle that he cites throughout his career4 as giving the various senses 
of “being” (ens) and “to be” (esse).5 Central to Thomas’s extensive commentary there 
is his thesis that every predication is a predication of being and that esse is signified 
in every predication.6 Call this the “Predication Thesis.” All authors writing on esse 
in Thomas’s thought admit that there are (at least nominally) three ways in which 
“esse” can be used. “Esse” can be used (a) for quiddities and natures, (b) for the act of 
essence, contrasted with essence, or (c) for the truth of a proposition in the mind.7 We 
will refer to these as “esse essentiae,” “esse existentiae,” and “esse ut verum,” respectively.8 
Most authors admit Thomas uses esse ut verum occasionally,9 but the judgment of 
Fr. Armand Maurer on esse essentiae seems to state the implicit assumption of most 
interpreters: “Although the use of esse to mean essence had a long tradition in the 
Middle Ages, going back at least to Boethius, St. Thomas himself reserved the term 
esse to mean the act of existing.”10 Using In V Metaphysics, I challenge this claim.
In what follows, I present an interpretation of Thomas’s Predication Thesis 
in which Thomas uses “esse” to refer primarily to esse essentiae. As an interlocutor, 
I have chosen Gyula Klima, who interprets this same thesis in an existential way. I 
have focused on the alternative interpretation of Klima principally because his views 
offer considerable common ground from which to argue for my own opposing 
view. In defending my own view, I hope to suggest two things: first, that Thomas’s 
notion of esse existentiae has no peculiar connection to the principal predicate “is”; 
and second, that ubiquitous terms in Thomas’s works—like “esse substantiale” and 
“esse in rerum natura”—might often refer to essence. While I think the argument of 
this paper would suffice to show that Aquinas’s In V Metaphysics uses “esse” to refer 
primarily to esse essentiae were it the case that In V Metaphysics had been the only 
place Aquinas addressed the senses of “esse,” in actual fact, Aquinas obviously wrote 
a great deal about “esse” in outside works. Since this paper does not engage these 
outside works in any great detail—largely consigning them to the footnotes—there 
is always the looming threat that, if my argument here were extended to those 
works, that procedure would reveal the reductio ad absurdum of my own position. 
For this reason, the goal of the present paper is not to show definitively that the 
primary sense of “esse” for Aquinas is essence, but instead merely to suggest that this 
might be so on the basis of a rather definitive text. The prospect of extending my 
conclusion to Aquinas’s personal writings is addressed in the final section of this 
paper, which touches on Fr. Stephen Brock and Ralph McInerny’s interpretation 
of “esse substantiale.”
Gyula Klima’s Existential Interpretation of the Copula
Gyula Klima discusses Thomas’s Predication Thesis both in his 2002 article, 
“Aquinas’ Theory of the Copula and the Analogy of Being,” and in his 1996 article, 
“The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being.” 
These papers interpret Thomas’s thesis in slightly different ways. Since the 2002 
paper is newer, discusses the issue at hand directly, and, unlike the 1996 one, is not 
intended for a non-Thomistic audience, I focus on the 2002 paper.
The bulk of Klima’s 2002 article is devoted to explaining why, for St. Thomas, 
every predication is a predication of being, and the signification of the copulative 
“is” in light of this thesis. During the course of the article, Klima presents four pairs 
of sentences.
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Pair 1 Pair 3
(1) Socrates is sighted. (1") Socrates is with respect to his sight.
(2) Socrates is blind. (2") Socrates is with respect to his blind-
ness.
Pair 2 Pair 4
(1') Socrates’s sight is (exists). (1"') Socrates is with respect to sight.
(2') Socrates’s blindness is (exists). (2"') Socrates is with respect to blindness.11
According to Klima, Pair 1 is related to Pair 2 by a biconditional.12 But Klima claims 
that, because of St. Thomas’s “inherence theory of predication,”13 the predicates in 
Pair 1 are just qualifications of the predicate “is.”14 When we say, Socrates is blind, 
we mean that Socrates is in respect of blindness. Thus, for Klima, Pair 3 is just a 
more explicit way of signifying what Pair 1 signifies, according to how St. Thomas 
would interpret Pair 1. From this identification of Pair 1 and Pair 3, Klima concludes 
that the qualified “senses of being” found in Pair 1 are the same as those found 
predicated of a subject in Pair 2.
In these two propositions [Pair 3] the sense of the predicate “is” is ex-
plicitly qualified by the addition of the significata of the predicates of 
(1) and (2) in the suppositum of their subject, namely, Socrates’s sight, 
and his blindness, respectively. But then we are certainly entitled to claim 
that the senses of being thus qualified are exactly the senses in which “is” 
(or “exists”) can be predicated of these significata in (1' ) and (2' ). So in 
this way it is clear that regarding (1) and (2) as expressing the qualified 
predications of being explicated by (1" ) and (2" ) also allows us to regard 
(1' ) and (2' ) as predicating being of their subjects precisely in the senses 
thus qualified, where these subjects are nothing but the significata of the 
predicates of (1) and (2). In general, on this basis we can claim that any 
ordinary predication of a common term is but a qualified predication of 
being, in which the significate of the common term in the suppositum of 
the subject specifies the sense in which that significate can be said to exist.15
Here, Klima makes the implicit assumption that Pair 2 must be a predication of 
being since it predicates “is” alone. Then he reasons from the premise that predicates 
qualify the copula to the conclusion that the predicate in Pair 2 has the same meaning 
as the copula in Pair 1. Thus, Pair 1 is a predication of being. Klima concludes that 
“the copula is not just a merely syncategorematic particle with the sole function 
of joining the predicate to the subject, but it retains the primary signification of 
the verb ‘is,’ which predicated in itself signifies the actual existence of the thing of 
which it is predicated.”16 So, when “is” is predicated by itself, Klima interprets “is” 
to signify esse existentiae; but when a predicate is some form, “the act of existence the 
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verb ‘is’ signifies is not the absolute existence of the suppositum of the subject, but 
the qualified existence of the form signified by the predicate, namely, the inherence 
of this form in the suppositum of the subject, which renders the suppositum actual 
in respect of this form.”17
Having reached this conclusion, Klima sees that “is” means many different 
things depending on how it is qualified by the principal predicate. It may mean 
substantial existence (e.g., if there is no predicate), accidental existence (e.g., if the 
predicate is “sighted”), or ens ut verum (e.g., if the predicate is “blind”). But this 
seems to contradict what Thomas says in In V Metaphysics, when he indicates that 
the copula always has the same meaning—namely, the truth of the composition in 
the mind between subject and predicate (ens ut verum).18 To resolve this apparent 
contradiction, Klima introduces Pair 4. The difference between Pair 3 and Pair 4 is 
that whereas the qualifying predicate in Pair 3 is an individual form, which is the 
ultimate thing signified by “sighted” or “blind,” the qualifying predicate in Pair 4 is 
the nature absolutely considered, which is the immediate thing signified by “sighted” 
and “blind.”19 Klima asserts that non-beings and natures absolutely considered have 
the same ontological status. Both are beings of reason.20 Thus, Pair 4 predicates always 
qualify the copula “is” of their Pair 1 equivalent in the same way—namely, as ens 
ut verum.21 So, the “is” of statements, like those in Pair 1, must be taken both with 
respect to the ultimate signification of the predicate (Pair 3) and with respect to the 
immediate signification thereof (Pair 4). With respect to the ultimate signification, 
the meaning of “is” may vary from case to case. But with respect to the immediate 
signification, the meaning is always the same—ens ut verum. In this way, Klima 
reconciles St. Thomas’s apparently incompatible claims that every predication is a 
predication of being, that predicates serve to qualify the verb “is” into different senses, 
and that the copula always signifies the same sense of “is”—namely, ens ut verum.
Philosophical Difficulties with Klima’s Copula
Before evaluating Klima’s theory of predication as an interpretation of St. 
Thomas, let us glance at some problems for it as a true theory. In the next section, we 
will consider Klima’s theory as an interpretation of Thomas. The first philosophical 
problem for Klima’s theory is this: Klima falls into a dilemma concerning simple 
statements. If his description of predication is correct, then it seems that one of two 
highly doubtful consequences must follow. Either, on the one hand, every predicate, 
besides “is,” is a compound predicate, or, on the other hand, adjectives like “white” 
and “just” can never be predicates. Take the example, “Socrates is white.” Klima 
asserts that “is” in such a sentence signifies existence—that is, the esse contrasted with 
form or essence in Thomas’s thought.22 If that is the case, then the word “white,” 
which signifies a certain form, necessarily signifies something other than what the 
copula “is” signifies. But if that’s the case, then, in the sentence, “Socrates is white,” 
either (a) “is” is not predicated, or (b) “white” is not predicated, or (c) there are two 
distinct predicates. Klima cannot deny that “is” is predicated since the purpose of 
his paper was to show that every predication is a predication of being. Thus, Klima 
must either deny that “white” and other quintessential predicates are in fact ever 
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predicates—making them instead something akin to adverbs23—or he must assert 
that quintessentially simple enunciations are in fact not simple, but rather have two 
predicates. In either case, Klima must part ways with our common understanding 
predicates and enunciations, and he must part ways with St. Thomas, who said both 
that “white” is a predicate and that “Socrates is white” has only one predicate. In In 
II Peri hermeneias, he writes:
We should consider that the verb “is” is sometimes predicated in an 
enunciation by itself (secundum se), as when it is said, “Socrates is.” By 
this, we do not intend to signify anything other than that Socrates is in 
the nature of things (in rerum natura). Sometimes, however, [“is”] is not 
predicated by itself (per se), as the principal predicate, but as conjoined to 
the principal predicate such that the principal predicate can be connected 
to the subject. For example, when it is said, “Socrates is white,” it is not 
the intention of the speaker that he assert Socrates to be in the nature 
of things, but that he attribute to Socrates whiteness by means of the 
verb “is.” And for this reason, in such cases, “is” is predicated as added 
to the principal predicate. And it is said to be a “third” [by Aristotle], 
not because it is a third predicate, but because it is the third thing said 
that is put in the enunciation, which—together with the predicated 
name—makes one predicate. As such, the enunciation is divided into 
two parts and not three.24
Let us ignore, until a later section, Thomas’s understanding of sentences in which 
“is” alone is predicated. What is relevant here is that, for Thomas, “white” is the 
principal predicate in the sentence, “Socrates is white.” Moreover, the enunciation 
has only two parts, one subject and one predicate. Since the name “white” doesn’t 
imply its own being predicated, it must be supplemented by the verb “is,” which, 
as a verb, implies predication.25 “Is” and “white” constitute one predicate26 in which 
“white” signifies a form, and “is” implies composition with a subject, but does not 
signify any added notion.
A second problem facing Klima’s theory concerns his claim that the predicate 
qualifies the existence that is predicated by the copula. Let us, for the moment, grant 
that the copula signifies existence. Even if we grant this, we should not grant that 
the predicate qualifies the existence being predicated in such a way that the copula 
signifies the existence of the thing predicated. As we saw, Klima believes that (1’) 
“Socrates’ sight is” predicates being of Socrates’ sight precisely in the sense qualified 
by the sentence, (1’’) “Socrates is with respect to his sight.”27 But this means that 
whenever we predicate an accident of a subject, the copula attributes that accident’s 
accidental existence to the subject as if the subject itself had accidental existence. 
But this does not seem to be what actually happens when we predicate accidents. 
When we predicate “white” of Socrates, we do not predicate whiteness’s accidental 
existence of Socrates, as if he were accidentally existing.28 Rather, we predicate 
“white” of Socrates, implying that whiteness accidentally exists in him. In short, if 
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the copula signifies existence, as Klima claims, and if it is qualified by accidental 
predicates, then it does not seem as though there is any way to predicate the copula, 
so qualified, truthfully of a substance.
The Logic of St. Thomas’s Predication Thesis
The problems raised in the last section suggest that we should find an alterna-
tive to Klima’s interpretation of St. Thomas’s Predication Thesis. To see the textual 
difficulties with Klima’s view and to establish an alternative, let us quote at length 
the text in which Thomas explicitly defends his thesis.
Note that “being” cannot be contracted in this way to something determi-
nate, as a genus is contracted to species by differentiae. For a differentia, 
since it does not participate the genus, is outside the essence of the ge-
nus. Nothing, however, can be outside the essence of being, such that it 
would constitute some species of being by addition to being. For what is 
outside of being is nothing (nihil) and cannot be a differentia. Whence 
. . . being cannot be a genus.
Whence we must say that being is contracted to diverse genera accord-
ing to a diverse mode of predicating (modus praedicandi), which results 
from a diverse mode of to-be (modus essendi); because “insofar as ‘being’ 
is said”—that is, in as many ways as something is predicated—“in that 
many ways is ‘to be’ signified”—that is, in that many ways is something 
signified to be. And on account of this, those things into which being is 
first divided are called the “predicaments,” because they are distinguished 
according to a diverse mode of predicating.
Because, therefore, of the things that are predicated, some signify what 
(quid)—that is, substance—some what sort (quale), some how much 
(quantum), and so on, it follows that in any mode of predicating, a “to 
be” signifies the same thing. For instance, when it is said, “Man is an 
animal,” “to be” signifies substance. But when it is said, “Man is white,”  
it signifies quality, and so on. For it should be noted that predicates can 
relate to a subject in three ways. In one way, [they can be related] as the 
that-which-is (id quod est) of the subject, as when I say, “Socrates is an 
animal.” For Socrates is that which is the animal. And this predicate is 
said to signify first substance, which is the substance of a particular of 
which all are predicated.
In a second way, [predicates can be related to a subject] such that what 
is predicated is taken according to what is in the subject (inest subiecto) 
. . . In a third way, [predicates can be related to a subject] such that 
what is predicated is taken from that which is outside the subject (extra 
subiectum) . . .
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But because some things are predicated in which “being” is not obviously 
predicated—as when it is said, “A man walks”—Aristotle goes on to re-
move this [objection]. He says that in all such predications something is 
signified to be. For any verb whatever is resolved into the verb “is” and a 
participle. For it in no way differs to say, “A man is convalescing,” and “A 
man convalesces.” The same goes for other cases. Whence it is clear that 
in as many ways as predication is made, in so many ways is “being” said.29
The first thing to note about St. Thomas’s line of reasoning is that he assumes an 
equivalence between predicating “is” and predicating “being” or “is a being.” He 
considers any predication to be a predication of ens so long as the predicate either 
includes the word “is” or is equivalent to one that includes the word “is”—even as 
a copula. Indeed, not a single one of Thomas’s examples includes an explicit predi-
cation of the word ens. Klima seems to agree that “is,” for Thomas, is equivalent to 
“is a being” since he makes use of this equivalence in his 1996 article.30
The second thing to note about Thomas’s argument is something Klima gives 
the grounds for recognizing, but which Klima does not draw attention to in his 
discussion of this passage. That is this: In the passage above, Thomas uses the abstract 
word “esse” not to refer to an abstractly signified notion, but to refer to the notion 
signified by the concrete words “is” or “is a being.” As Klima correctly argues when 
discussing Thomas’s semantics:
[T]he function of abstract terms seems to be precisely this, namely, to 
afford us the linguistic means to refer in a proposition to the significata of 
their concrete counterparts, since the concrete terms do not refer to their 
significata but to the things actually having their significata. Thus, whenever 
we need to refer not to the supposita but to the significata of a concrete 
term, we need an abstract term, corresponding to the concrete term.31
Now, in the passage above, it is clear that Thomas is using “esse” in this way. We can 
see this from the fact that, when Thomas gives examples of “esse being signified,” the 
abstract term “to be” never occurs. Rather, the concrete “is” is found. Consequently, 
it is a mistake to think, when Thomas says esse is signified in every predication, that 
Thomas thinks every predicate predicates the abstract notion esse. By comparison, 
suppose someone were to say that every time “white” or “blue” is predicated, there 
is a predication of color in which color is signified. There is a wrong way and right 
way to interpret this thesis. Interpreted correctly, the abstract word “color” is used 
to signify the notion signified concretely and implicitly in the predicate “white”—
namely, the more general concrete notion “colored.” The wrong way to interpret 
this thesis would be to suppose that, whenever someone predicates “white” or “blue” 
they also predicate the abstract notion “color” of the colored surface. The surface is 
not a color, but colored. Likewise, when Thomas says that esse is signified in every 
predicate, he does not mean that esse, taken abstractly, is always predicated. Rather, 
Thomas merely employs the abstract term “esse” to refer to what is predicated in 
every predication, namely, some specific version of “is a being.”
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A third thing to note about the passage above is that Thomas shows no inter-
est in predications in which “is” or “exists” is the final word or principal predicate. 
Klima argues that all predications are predications of being because they are some-
how equivalent to or entail a predication in which “is” is the principal predicate. 
In contrast, Thomas considers all predications to be predications of being merely 
because they include (implicitly or explicitly) a copulative “is.” Thus, he considers 
it an objection to his thesis that there are sentences in which no copula is found—
namely, sentences with a verb other than “be.” And, likewise, he takes it as a sufficient 
response to this objection to show that such sentences are equivalent to ones with 
an explicit copulative “is.”
Now, this equivalence between verbs, on the one hand, and “is” plus a partici-
ple, on the other, is something that follows from Thomas’s Aristotelian definition of 
verbs and participles in In I Peri hermeneias, l. 5. It, however, would be undermined 
should we assert, with Klima, that the copula “is” signifies the esse contrasted with 
created essences. To see this, let us briefly review Thomas’s definition of the verb. 
In l. 5, Thomas assigns three specific differences to the verb, one of which is held 
in common with the name (nomen) and participle (participium).32 The remaining 
two specific differences serve to clarify the nominal distinction between names and 
verbs, given in the previous lecture (l. 4). There St. Thomas nominally distinguished 
names from verbs on the grounds that names signify substances and verbs signify 
actions or passions.33 But it is not necessary, for Thomas, that names always signify 
substances and verbs always signify actions or passions.34 After all, “dehydration” is 
a name, and “lives” is a verb. St. Thomas ultimately distinguishes names from verbs 
not by what they signify, but by how they signify—that is, their consignification or 
mode of signifying (modus significandi). What is necessary is that names signify in 
the manner (per modum) of a substance, and that verbs signify in the manner of an 
action or passion. But an action, for St. Thomas, is something that precedes from 
an agent with motion.35 Likewise, a passion is a motion in a subject from something 
else.36 Thus, there are two distinguishing features of a verb. First, it must consignify 
the order of time that follows on motion, and, second, it must consignify a relation 
to some agent or patient from which motion arises or in which it inheres. Accord-
ingly, unlike a name, a verb consignifies time (i.e., it is tensed).37 In this respect, a 
verb is like a participle (e.g., “running”), which is also tensed.38 Thus, to distinguish 
verbs not only from names, but also from participles, St. Thomas says that verbs are 
always signs of something said of something—that is, verbs always consignify their 
own being predicated of some other word.39 Hence, verbs strictly speaking are never 
the subject term whereas names and participles may be subjected or predicated.
This conclusion gives St. Thomas the challenge of explaining infinitive verbs, 
which obviously can be the subject of a sentence, such as, “To walk is to be mov-
ing.”40 To resolve this problem, St. Thomas notes that infinitives are not verbs, 
strictly speaking.41 Whereas a verb consignifies the procession or inherence of the 
predicated notion, an infinitive directly signifies this procession or inherence. In this 
respect, infinitives are like names, not verbs. Yet, since infinitives signify what verbs 
consignify, we can extend the title “verb” analogously to them. Strictly speaking 
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verbs always imply predication. And, moreover, since implying predication is what 
defines a verb, nothing at all can be predicated except through a verb, which, for this 
reason, constitutes the formal part of an enunciation.42 Thus, either the predicate 
itself is a verb, or it is some other part of speech predicated by means of the verbal 
copula, “is” (“was,” “will be,” etc.).43 If the predicate is a verb other than “is,” then 
it signifies some notion as proceeding from or inhering in the notion of the subject 
and it signifies this notion with tense. For instance, the verb “kicks” signifies the 
motion of a foot towards an object in the present tense and as proceeding from the 
notion signified by the subject term. Now, the participle “kicking” also signifies this 
motion and signifies it as present. Thus, the only difference between “kicking” and 
“kicks” is that “kicks” consignifies composition with a subject. Since Thomas thinks 
the copula-participle pair, “is kicking,” is equivalent to the verb, “kicks,” Thomas 
evidently takes it to be the case that the copula adds nothing to the principal pred-
icate, “kicking,” besides the consignification of composition, which is included in 
the verb and absent from the isolated participle. Thus, Thomas does not think that 
the copula adds any signification to the principal predicate. It does not signify esse 
existentiae, for instance. Nor does it signify predication—that is, the composition of 
subject and predicate.44 Rather, it merely adds the consignification of predication in 
virtue of which the principal predicate can function as a predicate.
Now, this conclusion may lead us to think that “is” signifies nothing. We may 
think it is like a conjunction or preposition, which does not signify, but merely 
relates other significant words. St. Thomas denies this.45 But if the copula neither 
signifies nothing nor signifies something distinct from what the principal predicate 
signifies, the only remaining option is that the copula signifies the same thing as 
the principal predicate—albeit indeterminately. This is indeed what Thomas seems 
to think. In this respect, Klima is right that the function of the predicate term is 
to qualify the signification of the copula “is.”46 Where he goes wrong, as we have 
said, is to suppose that the copula signifies the esse that is contrasted with essence, 
and, therefore, that predicates qualify the notion of existence. Rather, “is” signifies 
the concretely signified analogical notion of being. Thus, predicates function not 
to qualify esse existentiae, but to qualify concrete ens. This is why, as we saw earlier, 
Thomas thinks that in the sentence, “Socrates is white,” the words “is white” con-
stitute a single predicate.47 The relationship of “is” to “white” is comparable to the 
relationship of “animal” to “human” in the phrase, “human animal,” since the way 
in which specific natures are added to the common notion of being is the way in 
which a species is added to a genus, which signifies the same thing as the species 
term, but does so indistinctly.48 Of course, whereas “animal” is a strict genus, pred-
icated univocally of its determining species, “being” is analogical, predicated simply 
of some more determinate notions (i.e., substances) and secundum quid of others 
(accidents, motions, negations).49 Moreover, since “animal” is a genus, it signifies 
something determinate (i.e., sentience) on its own, before “human” is added. In 
contrast, “is” signifies nothing determinately apart from what the principal predicate 
determines it to signify. Despite these differences, the point remains that “is” and 
the predicate “being” neither signify nothing nor do they signify something distinct 
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from the principal predicate. Rather, they signify merely the natures signified by 
any predicate whatsoever, but they signify these notions implicitly and indistinctly 
until the copula “is” is determined to one signification or another by a conjoined 
principal predicate.
Let us summarize our conclusions thus far. We saw that, for Thomas, any time 
in which “is” is predicated, even as a copula, there is a predication of being. Thomas 
takes “is” to be equivalent to “is a being.” Likewise, even if the word “is” does not 
occur, but a predicate merely consignifies in the manner of a copula, Thomas still 
considers this to be a predication of being. But we saw that, for anything to be 
predicated, it must be a verb or be predicated through a copula.50 If it is a verb, it 
consignifies in the manner of a copula and is equivalent to “is” plus a participle. It 
follows syllogistically that every predication is a predication of being. The middle term 
in this syllogism is the consignification of all predicates in the manner of a copula. 
The middle term has nothing to do with what we would, today, call “existential 
propositions.” But why should we agree with Thomas that whatever consignifies in 
the manner of a copula is a predication of being? To see that Thomas’s assumption 
is reasonable, suppose for the sake of argument that there are meaningful existential 
propositions (e.g., “Socrates is”) that do not reduce to propositions with a copula 
(e.g., “Socrates is a substance”). If so, then there are two different senses of “is”: 
the existential sense and the copulative sense. But even if that is so, the copulative 
sense is still more familiar to everyone. Thus, if we want to say what “being” and 
“is” signify (which is Thomas’s goal in In V Metaphysics), then we ought to start 
by describing what the copula signifies.51 But as we have seen, the copula signifies 
indeterminately every predicable notion whatsoever, but is only determinate with 
respect to its consignification—namely, its consignifying composition. Thus, every 
predicate whatsoever (e.g., “kicks,” “is just”) is a more or less determinate instance 
of the copula “is.” Since the notion of the copula gives us our primary notion of 
what “being” signifies, it is appropriate to conclude that every predication is a 
predication of being from the mere fact that a predicate signifies something in the 
manner of a copula.
As we saw earlier, in In V Metaphysics, Thomas says that esse is signified in 
every predication not because every predicate predicates the abstract notion of esse, 
but because Thomas intended the abstract term “esse” to refer to what the concrete 
term “is” signifies. Accordingly, since what the concrete term “is” signifies is every 
predicable nature whatsoever, it follows that, in In V Metaphysics, when Thomas 
uses the word “esse,” he is primarily using it in the sense of esse essentiae. Later in the 
lecture, he expands predicable notions to include not only essences outside the mind, 
but also beings of reason—thereby making “esse” to cover not only esse essentiae, but 
also esse ut verum. But “esse,” in the quotation from In V Metaphysics above, signifies 
the essences or natures signified implicitly and indistinctly by the concrete copula 
“is.” This is why Thomas says:
Because, therefore, of the things that are predicated, some signify what 
(quid)—that is, substance—some what sort (quale), some how much 
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(quantum), and so on, it follows that in any mode of predicating, a “to 
be” signifies the same thing. For instance, when it is said, “Man is an 
animal,” “to be” signifies substance. But when it is said, “Man is white,” 
it signifies quality.52
Some authors have tried to insert the words “existence of” into their translation of 
this passage, so that it reads, “When we say ‘A man is an animal,’ for example, the “is” 
signifies [the existence of a] substance.”53 At this point, it should be clear how much 
this distorts the meaning of Thomas’s text. Thomas does not say that “is” signifies 
the existence of a substance. No, he says it signifies substance. And moreover, Thomas 
does not use “is” to speak about what “is” signifies. Rather, he uses the abstract “esse” 
to refer to what “is” signifies. In V Metaphysics—the crucial text in which Thomas 
lays out the many senses of “being” referenced throughout his career—is a text in 
which Thomas makes ample use of the first meaning of “esse,” in which “esse” refers 
to essences in the ten categories. Moreover, Thomas has good reason to do so since 
abstract terms function to refer to what their concrete correlate signifies, and every 
predication is a more or less determinate concrete correlate of esse.
Esse in Rerum Natura and Esse Substantiale in In V Metaphysics
At this point, we have shown that Thomas’s Predication Thesis does not in-
dicate that every predicate predicates esse existentiae, but only that every predicate 
predicates esse essentiae or esse ut verum. To appreciate this conclusion, we must 
consider how Thomas interprets “is,” not as a copula, but as a principal predicate. 
Most Thomists interpret this “is” as signifying existence. Already we have seen 
that, for Thomas, when “is” is the principal predicate we signify nothing else than 
that something is “in rerum natura.”54 Now, it would be odd to interpret “in rerum 
natura” as referring to esse existentiae. First of all, St. Thomas does not invent this 
locution, but gets it from authors who are not usually associated with Thomas’s 
notion of existence. For instance, Augustine and Boethius use the phrase to describe 
the difference between what is a certain way according to its extramental nature, on 
the one hand, and what is only according to our way of thinking about it, on the 
other.55 In conformity, with this ancient precedent, Thomas, in In V Metaphysics, l. 
9, identifies esse in rerum natura with ens extra animam and sets it in opposition to 
esse ut verum, which is only in the mind.56
A second reason not to think that “is” as a principal predicate signifies esse 
existentiae is that it is hard to see how “esse in rerum natura” could be analyzed 
grammatically to mean esse existentiae. Thomas gives an exhaustive list of the ways 
in which we can use the preposition “in” in In IV Physics57 and, again, in In V Meta-
physics.58 The meanings of “in” are in brief: the relation of (1) something contained 
to a container, (2) an integral part to a whole, (3) a genus or differentia to a species, 
(4) a more specific notion to a more generic one, (5) form to matter, (6) a whole 
to its material parts, (7) an effect to its agent cause, and (8) an agent to its effect. 
Finally, Thomas explains that nothing can be “in itself ” strictly speaking. So, the 
phrase “in itself ” really signifies the negation of one of the earlier senses of being 
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“in.”59 Now, in the phrase “esse in rerum natura,” the preposition terminates in the 
word “nature.” If we interpret “in” in sense (1), we could see “natura” as the space 
outside the mind, and “esse in rerum natura” as equivalent to the ostensive notion 
Dasein or “being there.” But this would be an unusual use of the word natura for 
Thomas, who tends to use “natura” as a synonym for essence.60 Alternatively, if 
“natura” is interpreted as “essence,” then we can interpret “esse in rerum natura” 
in one of two ways since there are two senses of “essence.” “Essence” either refers 
to the whole individual or that by which the individual is what it is.61 If “natura” 
refers to the individual, then when Thomas says “is” signifies that a thing est in 
rerum natura, he is using “in” negatively like the phrase “in itself ” since the term 
of the preposition “in” would be the same individual as that to which the subject 
term refers. This interpretation causes problems, however. First, it would imply that 
when we apparently affirm “is” of some subject, we are really negating something.62 
Secondly, if “natura” refers to individuals, it is hard to see how the genitive “rerum” 
can attach to it. Thus, the phrase “in rerum natura” probably employs “natura” to 
refer not to individuals, but to the essence by which things are. Hence, “in” would 
be used in sense (4) to signify the relation of a more particular to a more universal. 
When Thomas says “is” predicated alone signifies the subject to be in rerum natura, 
all Thomas means is that “is” indicates the subject’s subjection to some predicate, 
whatever that be. So, “is” as a principal predicate has the same meaning as the copula 
“is”—namely, every predicable nature whatsoever—but unlike the copula, it isn’t 
determined by another word to signify one particular nature.63
Of course, “being” is not a univocal predicate. So, when “is” is predicated 
unqualifiedly, it is taken in the primary sense.64 But “is,” said simply, signifies the 
subject to be in act, not in potency.65 This is presumably why Thomas (and previ-
ous authors) associate esse in rerum natura with being outside the mind as opposed 
to mental beings. Although we can truthfully say, “A dinosaur is a substance,” or 
“A phoenix is an animal,” in a derivative sense of “is” in which we really mean, “A 
dinosaur was a substance,” and “A phoenix would be an animal,” we cannot make 
these predications in the primary sense of “is” since a phoenix and a dinosaur are 
only subjects receptive of predicates by the mind’s conceiving them as such. Since 
Thomas uses “esse in rerum natura” to describe how “is” said alone predicates any 
nature whatsoever indeterminately, but actually, of a subject, “esse in rerum natura” 
exactly corresponds to extramental being, as we would expect from the usage of 
Thomas and others.66 The consequence of this interpretation is that the modern 
distinction between existential and attributive predications is wholly anachronistic 
to Thomas’s thought.
Thomas’s In V Metaphysics, l. 9 gives us an example of how to read “is” as a 
principal predicate that, read in context, confirms our interpretation of “esse in 
rerum natura” and shows us how to read the similar phrase “esse substantiale.” As 
we have seen, Thomas divides the senses of “ens” and “esse” by the different kinds 
of predicates. The three most general kinds of predicates are: (1) those stating 
what the subject is, (2) those denominating the subject from what is in it, and (3) 
those denominating the subject from something outside of it. The first gives us the 
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category substance; the second, the categories quantity, quality, and relation; the 
third, the last six categories. These ten categories constitute the highest genera of 
what Thomas calls perfect being outside the mind (ens perfectum, extra animam).67 
But since being outside the mind causes truth in the mind, which is a similitude 
to what is outside it, truth in the mind can be called “being” by analogy to the ten 
categories.68 Ens extra animam and ens ut verum, then, constitute two “modes of 
being” (modis entis) for Thomas.
Note, however, that this second mode [i.e., ens ut verum] compares to the 
first [i.e., ens extra animam] as an effect to a cause. For from the fact that 
something is in the nature of things (in rerum natura est), truth and falsity 
in a proposition follows, which the intellect signifies by the verb “is,” as 
it is a verbal copula. But because the intellect considers something as if 
it were a certain being, which is, in itself, not a being, as negations and 
other such things, it follows that sometimes “to be” is said of something 
in this second way, and not in the first. For we say that blindness (caecitas) 
is in the second way from the fact that the proposition is true, which 
asserts something to be blind (caecum). We do not say it to be true in the 
first way, however. For blindness does not have some to-be in things, but 
rather is the privation of some to-be. It is accidental, however, to any-
thing that something true be affirmed of it by an intellect or a voice. For 
a thing is not referred to knowledge (scientia), but the converse. But the 
to-be that anything has in its nature is substantial. And for this reason, 
when it is said, “Socrates is,” if that is taken in the first mode, then it is a 
substantial predicate. For “being” is superior to any one being, as animal 
is with respect to man. If, however, it is taken in the second mode, it is 
an accidental predicate.69
Whereas in the previously quoted passage from In II Peri hermeneias, Thomas only 
interpreted the principal predicate “is” as esse in rerum natura, now he gives two 
meanings to this word. First it may signify ens ut verum, which is only accidentally 
predicated of anything. Alternatively, it may also signify esse in rerum natura, which 
is ens extra animam.70 In the latter case, Thomas characterizes the esse a thing has 
in its nature as “substantial.” Interpreted as such, the predicate “is” is a substantial 
predicate. In the context of the lecture, the adjective “substantial” has clear technical 
significance as applied to esse and predicates. Thomas has just finished dividing esse 
and predicates into substantial ones, inhering ones, and external ones. A substantial 
predicate is one that signifies what the subject is—that is, its quiddity. In short, not 
only does Thomas use “esse in rerum natura” to speak about a predication of essence, 
so too, Thomas uses “esse substantiale” for this purpose too.71 Moreover, Thomas 
gives no indication that “is” as a principal predicate has anything to do with esse 
existentiae. Rather, he is quite clear that it signifies essences—albeit indeterminately.
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Rearguard Defense of Esse Substantiale as Essential
As was noted in the introduction of this paper, the argument of this paper 
focuses on an isolated interpretation of a small part of one lecture of Aquinas’s com-
mentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Thus, if someone were to have strong convictions 
based on Aquinas’s outside works that Aquinas uses “esse substantiale” to designate 
a substantial act of existence and “esse accidentale” to designate an accidental act of 
existence, then what I have said may be dismissed as, at best, accurately describing 
an anomalous text where Aquinas doesn’t express his own views or, less favorably, 
misinterpreting a text by trying to read it in isolation from the rest of Aquinas’s 
corpus. This objection cannot, of course, be countered without setting out to do 
more than this paper intends—namely, a comprehensive study of how Aquinas uses 
“esse substantiale” and “esse accidentale.”
Thus, in closing, I would merely like to point out difficulties for two authors 
who, to my mind, are the most persuasive adherents to the existential interpretation 
of “esse substantiale” and “esse accidentale”: Ralph McInerny and Fr. Stephen Brock.72 
Unlike most authors who merely assume that “esse” in these phrases means existence, 
not essence, Fr. Brock, in one place, argues explicitly for this interpretation.73 Un-
fortunately, this paper does not have space to respond to his argument, but only to 
his conclusion, which, for McInerny, is an assumption and not a conclusion. Two 
central texts in Fr. Brock and McInerny’s interpretation of “esse substantiale” are 
Prima secundae, q. 18, a. 1 and Expositio De ebdomadibus, c. 2.74 Fr. Brock takes 
the former text to imply that every substance has multiple beings (esse), substantial 
and accidental, which together make up the substance’s fullness of being (plentitudo 
essendi). McInerny takes the latter text as exhibiting Aquinas’s distinction between 
form and existence. This interpretive assumption is based implicitly on the fact 
that, in the text in question, Aquinas says form is the principle of esse, but nothing 
can be the principle of itself.75 We will address these lines of reasoning briefly and 
in reverse order.
McInerny’s implicit argument fails to necessitate his conclusion. In the passage 
in question—and parallel ones such as in De Principiis and Prima pars, q. 5, a. 1, 
ad1—it is substantial and accidental forms that Aquinas calls the principle of esse 
substantiale or esse accidentale, respectively. But such forms are distinct not only from 
any hypothesized existential act, but also from the essence of the composite substance 
(e.g., a human) and the accidental compound of substance with accident (e.g., a 
white human). So, it would seem inconclusive whether the distinction between form 
and esse in these texts is a distinction of form and esse existentiae or a distinction of 
a form and composite essence. Yet, here again, Aquinas’s commentaries on Aristotle 
seem to shed light on how to resolve this ambiguity. In De Principiis, c. 1, Aquinas 
explicitly gives “hominem esse” and “hominem esse album” as examples of esse sub-
stantiale and esse accidentale, respectively. The former is also called “esse simpliciter” 
and the latter “esse secundum quid.” These examples and the whole discussion of De 
Principiis appears to differ only in wording from that of Expositio De ebdomadibus, 
c. 2, and Prima pars, q. 5, a. 1, ad1. But when we look to Thomas’s commentaries 
on Aristotle, he explicitly states that “esse hominem” and other such phrases refer 
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to quiddity or what-it-was-to-be. For instance, in In III De Anima, to distinguish a 
subject from its quiddity, Thomas writes:
“Magnitude is other than for-magnitude-to-be (magnitudini esse)”—that 
is, magnitude is other than its that-which-it-is. For the to-be which 
pertains to magnitude names the quiddity of it. Likewise, “water and 
for water to be (aque esse)” are distinct “and the same goes for other 
cases”—that is, in all mathematical and natural cases. For this reason, 
[Aristotle] gave two examples, magnitude being a mathematical case and 
water a natural case.76
Again, in the Metaphysics commentary, Aquinas comments on Aristotle as follows:
When [Aristotle] says “that this is (hoc esse)” or “for this to be (huic esse),” 
he means the that-which-it-was-to-be of the thing. For example, “for man 
to be (homini esse)” or “that man is (hominem esse)” means that which 
pertains to the that-which-man-is. But that it is  the “that the musical is 
(musicum esse)”—that is, the that-which-it-is itself of the musical—does 
not pertain to your that-which-you-are.77
These passages show Aquinas explicitly identifying the examples of esse substantiale 
from outside works as technical expressions of the Aristotelian that-which-it-was-
to-be or quiddity. So, if the outside texts, which call substantial form a principle of 
esse substantiale and accidental form a principle of esse accidentale, are in themselves 
ambiguous as to whether they employ esse existentiae or esse essentiae, these passages 
from Aquinas’s Aristotelian commentaries could resolve the ambiguity in favor of 
esse essentiae.78 Having mitigated the impact of McInerny’s implicit argument, we 
must turn to Fr. Brock’s analysis of Prima secundae, q. 18, a. 1, which concerns how 
a thing has the fullness of to-be through its acquisition of esse substantiale and esse 
accidentale.
Fr. Brock’s interpretation of ST I–II, q. 18 requires that what is being described 
as having the fullness of being be a substance to which successive beings (esse) can be 
attributed. For instance, by substantial form, a substance receives substantial being; 
and by whiteness or virtue, a substance receives some accidental being. These taken 
together constitute the fullness of being. But even if we grant that it makes sense to 
attribute accidental existence to a substance inasmuch as substances are in a certain 
way (e.g., virtuous) accidentally, still, we surely cannot attribute both substantial 
and accidental existence to an accident. But Fr. Brock leaves off commenting on 
the corpus of ST I–II, q. 18, a. 1 just as Aquinas begins to attribute esse substantiale 
and esse accidentale to an accident—namely, a human action. After having said that 
goodness consists in the fullness of being such that, if something defects in any way 
from the fullness of being, it won’t be good simply, but only in a certain respect, 
Aquinas concludes:
The Logic behind Thomas Aquinas’s Predication Thesis 277
So it must be said that every action, insofar as it has something of to-be, in 
that degree does it have goodness. Inasmuch as it defects from something 
of the fullness of to-be, which is owed to human action, in that degree 
it defects from goodness.79
Here, what has the fullness of being by possessing all due beings (esse) and by not 
lacking any due beings (esse) is not a substance, but a human action signified ab-
stractly in the mode of substance.80 To my mind, the plainest reading of this text is 
that the beings (esse) lacking to evil actions or had in fullness by good actions are 
nothing else than the due circumstances of an action, which constitute the species 
and accidents of human action. But if an accident (i.e., a human action) here can 
have both esse substantiale and esse accidentale, then we can hardly say, with Fr. 
Brock, that these phrases refer to so many acts of existence and that that to which 
both esse substantiale and esse accidentale are ascribed is substance. Because, contra Fr. 
Brock, “esse substantiale” and “esse accidentale” seem to be nothing else than what is 
signified by an essential predicate (e.g., human) and an accidental compound (e.g., 
white human), respectively, there is no problem attributing to both substances and 
accidents esse substantiale inasmuch as accidents have essences by analogy to sub-
stances.81 Thus, in another place, Aquinas says that, in the sentence “Color is,” the 
“is” predicated of the abstractly signified accident, “color,” is a “substantial predicate” 
answering the question “what is it?” when “is” is taken according to the first sense 
of “being”—the being that signifies something “existing in nature” and which “is 
divided by the ten genera.”82
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essentiam rerum prout dividitur per decem genera; alio modo secundum quod esse significat 
compositionem quam anima facit; et istud ens Philosophus, V Metaph., text. 14, appellat 
verum.” Cf. DM, q. 1, a. 1, ad19 (Leon. 23.8: 468–477). For some authors discussing this 
threefold division, see: Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 24; Keith Buersmeyer, “The Verb and 
Existence,” The New Scholasticism 60.2 (1986): 156–158; Maurer, “Introduction,” in On 
Being and Essence, 2nd ed., (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediæval Studies, 1968), 
15–17; Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 224.
8. Thomas initiates the use of the phrase “esse essentiae,” by saying the three persons 
of the Trinity are united in esse essentiae divinae, which in God is the same as actus essentiae, 
since in God essentia and actus essentiae are one. In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad1. Some Thom-
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ists interpret “esse essentiae” as a decadent scholastic notion of a being pertaining to essences 
apart from the existence they receive from God. Owens, Christian Metaphysics, 105n12 and 
134n8. Such a notion, if it has any foundation in later scholasticism, should be unequivocally 
rejected. But this paper intends the phrase only to refer to Thomas’s first sense of “esse” which 
is not an existence belonging to pure essences, but the essences themselves. For a defence of 
the phrase “esse essentiae,” see Thomas Osborne, “Continuity and Innovation in Dominic 
Bañez’s Understanding of Esse: Bañez’s Relationship to John Capreolus, Paul Soncinas, and 
Thomas De Vio Cajetan,” The Thomist 77.3 (2013): 368–369.
9. E.g., ST I, q. 3, a. 4, ad2; In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, co; DM, q. 1, a. 1, ad19. For 
helpful secondary literature on ens ut verum, see: Christopher Martin, Thomas Aquinas: God 
and Explanations, (Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 50–79; Gyula Klima, “The Changing 
Role of ‘Entia Rationis’ in Mediaeval Semantics and Ontology: A Comparative Study with a 
Reconstruction,” Synthese 96.1 (1993): 25–58; Klima, “The Semantic Principles Underlying 
Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996): 
87–141; Ralph McInerny, Being and Predication, (Washington, DC: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1986), esp. 204–228; Gaston LeNotre, “Thomas Aquinas and the Method 
of Predication in Metaphysics,” PhD diss., (The Catholic University of America, 2016), esp. 
168–88. See also Turner Nevitt, “Aquinas on Essence and Existence,” PhD diss., (Fordham 
University, 2015). Nevitt’s thesis is rare in the literature in that it argues esse ut verum is 
dispensable. Ibid., 145–178.
10. Maurer, “Introduction,” 15–16. See also Janice Schultz and Edward Synan, eds., 
“Introduction,” in In hebd., xxvii, who endorse Maurer’s thesis. There are two noteworthy 
exceptions to the rule that modern Thomists dismiss the first sense of “esse.” One exception 
to this is Gregory Doolan in his unpublished paper, “Aquinas on The Distinction Between 
Esse and Esse: How the Name “esse” Signifies Essence in Metaphysics Δ.7,” on Academia.edu. 
Another is Msgr. John Wippel. Like the present paper, Wippel interprets “esse” in one 
paragraph of In V Metaphysics l. 9, as referring to substance, quality, quantity, etc. (Wippel, 
Metaphysical Thought, 212). But he does not extend this interpretation to the rest of the 
lecture or outside texts, nor does he explain why it makes sense to interpret “esse” in this way.
11. Klima, “Theory of the Copula,” 163, 166. Emphases are my own. The nomen-
clature of “pairs” is not found in Klima’s article, but he does group the propositions in the 
same way I have numbered them, so it is appropriate, for the sake of clarity in this summary, 
to give these groupings official titles—namely, Pair 1, Pair 2, et cetera.
12. Ibid., 163.
13. For further explanation of the “inherence theory of predication,” see Klima, “Se-
mantic Principles,” 97–110. There are some outstanding difficulties and ambiguities with the 
inherence theory of predication, some of which have been suggested more recently by Klima 
himself among others. It is also an open question whether Thomas did in fact espouse such 
a theory. For these problems, see: Klima, “Geach’s Three Most Inspiring Errors Concerning 
Medieval Logic,” Philosophical Investigations 38.1–2 (2015): 34–51; Thomas Osborne, 
“Which Essence Is Brought into Being by the Existential Act?” The Thomist 81.4 (2017): 
471–505 (at 482–484); John Malcolm, “A Reconsideration of the Identity and Inherence 
Theories of the Copula,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 17.4 (1979): 383–400.
14. Klima, “Theory of the Copula,” 163. See also, Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 
124: “Just as in ‘ordinary predications’ we can attach various qualification to the predicate, 
so these ‘ordinary predications’ themselves may be regarded as various qualifications of the 
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predication of being. According to this analysis, therefore, when we say, ‘A man is blind,’ 
this is equivalent to saying, ‘A man’s blindness is’ which in turn, is equivalent to saying, ‘A 
man is with respect to his blindness.’”
15. Klima, “Theory of the Copula,” 163.
16. Ibid., 164–165.
17. Ibid., 165.
18. Ibid. See: In V Metaphysicorum, l. 9, 895–896.
19. Klima, “Theory of the Copula,” 166.
20. In this paper, I do not have space to address Klima’s premise that the nature 
absolutely considered is a being of reason. Nevertheless, this premise seems to be a further 
problem for Klima’s argument. The whole point of Thomas bringing up the nature absolutely 
considered (e.g., De ente, c. 3) is to abstract the quidditative content of a being from any 
particular mode of to-be, such as in the mind or in an individual outside the mind. If the 
nature absolutely considered were a being of reason, then it would be identical to the nature 
in the mind, which would undermine Thomas’s claim that the nature absolutely considered 
is what is common to individuals outside the mind and species in the mind. Cf. Osborne, 
“Which Essence Is Brought into Being by the Existential Act?” 472: “. . . the essence abso-
lutely considered is an essence to which it makes absolutely no sense to attribute existence.”
21. Klima, “Theory of the Copula,” 166–167.
22. E.g., ibid., 167.
23. Owens, Christian Metaphysics, 75: “The nature cannot take on an adverbial relation 
to its being [esse]. Man cannot be regarded as basically a certain portion of being that exists 
humanly.”
24. In I Peri., l. 2 (Leon. 1.79–80:2): “Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod 
hoc verbum est quandoque in enunciatione praedicatur secundum se; ut cum dicitur, Socrates 
est: per quod nihil aliud intendimus significare, quam quod Socrates sit in rerum natura. 
Quandoque vero non praedicatur per se, quasi principale praedicatum, sed quasi coniunc-
tum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto; sicut cum dicitur, Socrates est 
albus, non est intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in rerum natura, sed ut attribuat ei 
albedinem mediante hoc verbo, est; et ideo in talibus, est, praedicatur ut adiacens principali 
praedicato. Et dicitur esse tertium, non quia sit tertium praedicatum, sed quia est tertia dictio 
posita in enunciatione, quae simul cum nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum, ut sic 
enunciatio dividatur in duas partes et non in tres.”
25. The reason names cannot be predicated without a verb, but that verbs can be 
predicated through themselves will be discussed in the next section.
26. Besides the authority and reasoning of Thomas, this thesis is also accepted by: 
McInerny, Being and Predication, 174; Kenny, Aquinas on Being, 179; Gilson, Being and Some 
Philosophers, 224–225.
27. Klima, “Theory of the Copula,” 164.
28. De Principiis, c. 1, 2: “subiectum est quod non habet esse ex eo quod advenit, sed 
per se habet esse completum; sicut homo non habet esse ab albedine . . . Unde, simpliciter 
loquendo, forma dat esse materiae, accidens autem non dat esse subiecto, sed subiectum 
accidenti.” Some Thomists do attribute accidental existence to substances as a secondary 
existence accruing to a substance after its substantial existence. That is because these authors 
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identify Aquinas’s “esse accidentale” and “esse substantiale” with esse existentiae, not esse essentiae. 
Moreover, they largely ignore “esse accidentis.” Cf. Owens, Christian Metaphysics, 148; Ralph 
McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas, (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 
1990), 192 and 207–209; Brock, “Harmonizing Plato and Aristotle on Esse: Thomas Aquinas 
and the ‘De Hebdomadibus,’” Nova et Vetera 5.3 (2007): 489–491; ibid., “How Many Acts 
of Being Can a Substance Have? An Aristotelian Approach to Aquinas’s Real Distinction,” 
International Philosophical Quarterly 54.3, 215 (2014): 317–331. As will become clear later, 
the contention of this paper is that “esse accidentale” and “esse substantiale” usually use “esse” 
in the sense of essence. Thus, the indisputable fact that Aquinas attributes “esse accidentale” 
to substances throughout his works does not contradict my claim that accidental existence 
is not attributed to substances. Moreover, even if esse accidentale were an accidental existence 
attributed to substances (and not rather an accidental composite of essences, as I interpret 
it), then this would still undermine Klima’s argument since, in that case, although we now 
attribute accidental existence of Socrates with respect to his sight, we can no longer attribute 
the same accidental existence to Socrates’s accident of sight. In any case, I do not think that 
accidental existence is attributed to substances since, by “accidental existence,” I mean what 
Aquinas signifies by “esse accidentis,” not what he signifies by “esse accidentale.” As the name 
suggests, “esse accidentis” is clearly attributed to accidents, not substances. On the nature of 
esse accidentis, see: Note 29. Further reasons not to view esse accidentale as an act of existence 
are given in the final section of this paper.
29. In V Metaphysicorum, l. 9, 889–893: “Sciendum est enim quod ens non potest hoc 
modo contrahi ad aliquid determinatum, sicut genus contrahitur ad species per differentias. 
Nam differentia, cum non participet genus, est extra essentiam generis. Nihil autem posset 
esse extra essentiam entis, quod per additionem ad ens aliquam speciem entis constituat: 
nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia esse non potest. Unde . . . ens, genus esse non 
potest. Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum 
praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia ‘quoties ens dicitur,’ idest quot 
modis aliquid praedicatur, ‘toties esse significatur,’ idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse. Et 
propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur 
secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam 
significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet 
quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, 
esse significat substantiam. Cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic 
de aliis.—Sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad subiectum tripliciter se potest habere. 
Uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates 
est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est 
substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur.—Secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur 
secundum quod inest subiecto . . . Tertio modo ut praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod est extra 
subiectum . . . —Quia vero quaedam praedicantur, in quibus manifeste non apponitur hoc 
verbum est, ne credatur quod illae praedicationes non pertineant ad praedicationem entis, 
ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat, ideo consequenter hoc removet, dicens quod in omnibus 
huiusmodi praedicationibus significatur aliquid esse. Verbum enim quodlibet resolvitur in 
hoc verbum est, et participium. Nihil enim differt dicere, homo convalescens est, et homo 
convalescit, et sic de aliis. Unde patet quod quot modis praedicatio fit, tot modis ens dicitur.” 
For a parallel division of being according to modes of predicating, see: In III Phys., l. 5. Also, 
cf. In I Peri., l. 5, (Leon. 1.27:18): “Quamvis enim omne verbum finitum implicet esse, quia 
currere est currentem esse, et omne verbum infinitum implicet non esse, quia non currere est 
non currentem esse.”
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For a general overview of this division of being into categories in Aquinas’s In V Meta-
physics and In III Physics, sticking closely to Aquinas’s wording with minimal interpretation, 
see: Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 208–228. For a critique of Wippel, which attempts to 
explain the division of being into categories according to the three modes of per se predication, 
see Paul Symington, “Thomas Aquinas on Establishing the Identity of Aristotle’s Categories,” 
in Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, ed. Lloyd Newton, (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 
119–144. For a study of modes of predicating in light of medieval semantics, see Buersmey-
er, “The Verb and Existence,” 159; Keith Buersmeyer, “Aquinas on the Modi Significandi,” 
93; E. J. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: 
A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 39–67. For 
a standard attempt to explain the structure of Aquinas’s In V Metaphysics, l. 9, which is the 
context for this division of the categories according to modes of predication, see: McInerny, 
Being and Predication, 190–228. For a general ahistorical attempt to explain what we have 
called Aquinas’s Predication Thesis in light of Aquinas’s commentary on Peryermenias, see: 
Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The Sense of Mystery: Clarity and Obscurity in the Intellectual 
Life, trans. Matthew Minerd, (Steubenville: Emmaus Academic, 2017), 62–72. Although it 
differs in its conclusions and arguments, Garrigou-Lagrange’s study takes roughly the same 
approach to Aquinas’s Predication Thesis as the discussion to follow in the present paper inas-
much as it (implicitly) attempts to illuminate In V Metaphysics by means of In I Peryermenias. 
Thus, we refer to Garrigou-Lagrange where our opinions differ or agree in relevant ways.
Besides In V Metaphysics, l. 9, important texts for understanding what Thomas means 
by modi essendi include Thomas’s division of “being” in In IV Metaphysicorum, l. 1 and DV, 
q. 1, a. 1, co., as well as Thomas’s definition of ‘person’ in ST I, q. 29, and DP, q. 9. In In 
IV Metaphysicorum, l. 1, Thomas lays out four modi essendi corresponding respectively to (a) 
substances, (b) accidents, (c) change, and (d) negations. He describes the first as per se, the 
second as in a subject, the third as towards some other being, and the fourth as only in the 
mind. There are interpretive disagreements both concerning the epistemic relation of modi 
essendi to modi praedicandi as well as the ontological status of modi essendi in themselves. 
In the epistemic realm, Buersmeyer believes that Thomas uses prior knowledge of modi 
essendi to discover the modi praedicandi. Buersmeyer, “Aquinas on the Modi Significandi,” 
93; Buersmeyer, “The Verb and Existence,” 159. Msgr. Wippel correctly (in my opinion) 
interprets Thomas to mean that the modi praedicandi reveal the modi essendi. Wippel, Meta-
physical Thought, 211.
There are also differing views on the metaphysical role of modi essendi. The most 
popular position is that the modi essendi are equivalent to the essence or form that receives 
existence. See, e.g., Gerald Phelan, “The Being of Creatures: St. Thomas’ Solution of the 
Dilemma of Parmenides and Heraclitus,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Association 31 (1957): 124; W. Norris Clarke, Person and Being, The Aquinas Lecture, 1993, 
(Marquette University Press, 2004), 28; William Carlo, “Commentary on Gerald B. Phelan 
(A),” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 31 (1957): 128; Owens, 
Christian Metaphysics, 152n13; Francis Cunningham, “Averroes vs. Avicenna on Being,” The 
New Scholasticism 48.2 (1974): 203; Matthew Schaeffer, “The Thick-Esse/Thin-Essence View 
in Thomistic Personalism,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89.2 (2015): 223–251. 
Klima could be interpreted as cautiously identifying forms or essences with modi essendi 
(cf. Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 136–137 and 140), but he has denied this identification 
on Academia.edu. Msgr. Wippel also could be interpreted to have partially identified modi 
essendi and essence, and I know of no place where he denies it. He argues against Carlo, that 
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it is wrong to reduce essence to “nothing but a given mode of existence.” Wippel, Metaphys-
ical Thought, 190–192. Wippel’s statement grammatically implies that essence is, in part, a 
mode of existence.
Jacques Maritain and Tomarchio both maintain that essence is not at all a modus essendi. 
Rather, Maritain maintains that the modes of being are terminations of essence by which 
the essence is suited to receive existence. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald 
Phelan, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 246; ibid., Existence and the 
Existent, 54–55. In a slight, but positive twist, Tomarchio says instead that the modi essendi 
are determinations or termini of existence, not essence. Tomarchio, “Aquinas’s Division of 
Being According to Modes of Existing,” The Review of Metaphysics 54.3 (2001): 585–613 
(esp. 600–603, 606). Nevertheless, Tomarchio denies that the modi essendi are reducible to 
existence. Ibid., 602. Moreover, Tomarchio seems to identify the modi essendi with the cat-
egories, ibid., 597: “the categories constitute modes of universal being.” See also ibid., 589, 
596. Whereas the previous authors, who are explicit on the matter (excluding Maritain), 
place modi essendi within a two-fold division between essence and existence, Tomarchio 
sees a three-fold division between existence, essence, and the categories, as if the categories 
were outside of the essences of creatures. My own position is that “esse” (i.e., esse existentiae) 
signifies the modi essendi indeterminately.
I agree with Tomarchio that the modi essendi determine esse, but do not see how it is 
possible simultaneously to affirm this and also to deny that the modi essendi are reducible 
to esse. Just as species are reducible to the sum of differentiae, so too, esse is reducible to the 
modi essendi that determine it. In one of Thomas’s longest passages devoted to the distinction 
between esse and essence in all creatures, Thomas says that, whereas form is that by which a 
thing is, esse is that by which a thing is “denominated a being.” ScG II, c. 54 (Leon. 13.392). 
But Thomas is very clear, in In IV Metaphysicorum, l. 1, 539 and in In I Ethicorum, c. 7 
(Leon. 47.26:165–27:210), that the way in which things are denominated “beings” is from 
their diverse proportions to a common subject—namely, substance. So, for instance, that by 
which an accident is called a being is its inherence. As Thomas says throughout his career, 
“esse accidentis est inesse et dependere” (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, co). See also: In I Sent., 
d. 46, q. 1, a. 2, co; ST I–II, q. 110, a. 2, ad3; DP q. 7, a. 7, co; DP q. 8, a. 2, co; QDq, 
IX, q. 3, ad1 (Leon. 25.99:66); In V Metaphysicorum, l. 9, 894; In VII Metaphysicorum, l. 4, 
1352. Msgr. Wippel makes a brief comment to dismiss an interpretation like the one I am 
taking, but to defend my position would require a further paper. See Wippel, Metaphysical 
Thought, 235. Here, I will note one advantage to my interpretation is that it explains why 
there are three senses of “esse.” The primary function of “esse” in Latin seems to be to signify 
the predicate through indirect speech. But predicates can signify either real beings or beings 
of reason. And moreover “esse” can be used either for what is principally predicated in speech 
or for that in virtue of which the predicate is a predicate—namely, the consignification of 
the verb “is.” Thus, there are three things “esse” can signify: (a) real being (ens perfectum, extra 
animam), (b) beings of reason (ens ut verum), or (c) the modi essendi, corresponding to the 
modi praedicandi (i.e., mode of consignification of composition) of the predicate. This last 
one seems to be the esse contrasted with essence in Thomas’s philosophy. It is the actuality 
of forms because it is that in virtue of which forms are acts with respect to some subject.
30. Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 120. See also Garrigou-Lagrange, The Sense of 
Mystery, 52: “Every proposition is composed of at least two parts—the subject and the 
predicate—reunited by the copula, which is reduced to the verb ‘to be.’ However, it hap-
pens that a proposition is sometimes expressed as a single word. For instance, consider the 
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Latin sum. . . . Nevertheless, the sense of these is: ego sum existens.” Other Thomists, such 
as Gilson, deny that “is” is equivalent to “is a being” (Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 
209). Wippel also implies that he is unwilling to read “is” as “is a being” since he denies that 
Thomas’s conversion of verbs into “is” plus a participle in In V Metaphysics extends beyond 
“attributive judgments” to “existential statements” (Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 212).
31. Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 113. Wippel also implicitly endorses this reading 
of “esse” in the passage in question. When Wippel sees the word “esse” here, he rightly inter-
prets it as meaning what is signified by “is an animal,” “is white,” etc. Wippel, Metaphysical 
Thought, 212. Far more than modern English speakers, Latin philosophers would be inclined 
to recognize the value of infinitives as abstract terms to refer to the signification of concrete 
terms since classical Latin always uses infinitives in this function within indirect speech.
32. Below, I focus exclusively on the differentiae by which the verb is separated from 
the name and participle. On the relation of other parts of speech to the name and verb, see 
In I Peri., l. 1, (Leon. 1.9:6). Buersmeyer, “Verb and Existence,” 149n13: “The word ‘nomen’ 
is ambiguous in Latin since it can refer to either a ‘nomen substantivum’ such as ‘homo’ or a 
‘nomen adjectivum’ such as ‘albus,’ with the result that the noun and adjective were classed 
together.” The secondary literature on Thomas’s theory of verbs and names is sparse. Nev-
ertheless, there are some who have touched on the issue in the context of Thomas’s theory 
of signification. For these discussions, see: Ibid.; Buersmeyer, “Modi Significandi”; Klima, 
“Semantic Principles”; Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Cen-
tury Logic”; Umberto Eco, et al., “‘Latratus Canis’ or: The Dog’s Barking,” in Frontiers in 
Semiotics, ed. John Deely, et al., (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 63–73.
33. In I Peri., l. 4 (Leon. 1.19–20:1).
34. Cf. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.24:5, 25:9); In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad3 (Mandonnet 
532–33).
35. In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ad3 (Mandonnet 225): “actio, secundum quod est 
prædicamentum, dicit aliquid fluens ab agente, et cum motu; sed in Deo non est aliquid 
medium secundum rem inter ipsum et opus suum, et ideo non dicitur agens actione quæ 
est prædicamentum, sed actio sua est substantia.”
36. In III Phys., l. 5.
37. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.23–24:2): “Ponit autem tres particulas in definitione ver-
bi: quarum prima distinguit verbum a nomine, in hoc scilicet quod dicit quod consignificat 
tempus.”
38. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.24:4); In I Peri., l. 4 (Leon. 1.20:7). An important difference 
between the way participles are tensed and the way in which verbs are tensed is this. Whereas 
verbs consignify time directly inasmuch as they signify motion, participles consignify time 
only insofar as they signify a subject as underlying a certain motion. To avoid confusion, 
it is important to note: In English, unlike in Latin, we often use the grammatical form of 
the participle to signify action abstractly in the way that both Thomas and English speakers 
use the infinitive. For instance, whereas Aquinas sees “currens” as something that runs, we 
would not attribute the predicate “runs” to the English grammatical equivalent of “currens,” 
namely, “running.” Likewise, we would consider the sentences, “To run is an action,” and 
“Running is an action” as equivalent; Aquinas would not say “Currens est actio,” but “Currens 
est homo.” Here, we see an ambiguity in our English grammar that obscures the clarity of 
Thomas’s logic. In Thomas’s Latin, it is rare to find a participle used abstractly in a way that 
would make it synonymous with the infinitive. Presumably, English prefers the participle to 
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the infinitive for this abstract reference because of the clunky form in which infinitives are 
written in English.
39. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.24:4): “Tertia vero particula est, per quam distinguitur 
verbum non solum a nomine, sed etiam a participio quod significat tempore; unde dicit: Et est 
semper eorum, quae de altero praedicantur nota, idest signum: quia scilicet nomina et participia 
possunt poni ex parte subiecti et praedicati, sed verbum semper est ex parte praedicati.” In 
I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.25:9): “Verborum . . . de altero praedicantur, non est sic intelligendum, 
quasi significata verborum sint quae praedicantur; quia cum praedicatio videatur magis 
proprie ad compositionem pertinere, ipsa verba sunt quae praedicantur, magis quam sig-
nificent praedicata.—Est ergo intelligendum quod verbum semper est signum quod aliqua 
praedicentur, quia omnis praedicatio fit per verbum ratione compositionis importatae, sive 
praedicetur aliquid essentialiter sive accidentaliter.”
40. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.24:5).
41. Ibid.: “Potest autem actio significari tripliciter: uno modo per se in abstracto, velut 
quaedam res, et sic significatur per nomen . . . alio modo, per modum actionis, ut scilicet 
est egrediens a substantia et inhaerens ei ut subiecto, et sic sgnificatur per verba aliorum 
modorum, quae attribuuntur praedicatis. Sed quia etiam ipse processus vel inhaerentia ac-
tionis potest apprehendi ab intellectu et significari ut res quaedam, inde est quod ipsa verba 
infinitivi modi, quae significant ipsam inhaerentiam actionis ad subiectum, possunt accipi 
ut verba, ratione concretionis, et ut nomina prout significant quasi res quasdam.”
42. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.25:9): “omnis praedicatio fit per verbum ratione compo-
sitionis importatae, sive praedicetur aliquid essentialiter sive accidentaliter.” In I Peri., l. 8 
(Leon. 1.37:9): “cum enunciatio constet ex nomine et verbo, quare non facit mentionem de 
nomine, sicut de verbo? . . . quia, sicut supra dictum est, verbum est nota eorum quae de 
altero praedicantur. Praedicatum autem est principalior pars enunciationis, eo quod est pars 
formalis et completiva ipsius.” In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.24:3): “Potest etiam aliter dici quod 
quia verbum importat compositionem, in qua perficitur oratio verum vel falsum significans, 
maiorem convenientiam videbatur verbum habere cum oratione, quasi quaedam pars formalis 
ipsius, quam nomen, quod est quaedam pars materialis et subiectiva orationis.” In I Peri., l. 
6 (Leon. 1.31:5): “Exponit ergo qod dixerat aliquid partium orationis esse significativum, 
sicut hoc nomen homo, quod est pars orationis, significat aliquid, sed non significat ut 
affirmatio aut negatio, quia non significat esse vel non esse. Et hoc dico non in actu, sed 
solum in potentia. Potest enim aliquid addi, per cuius additionem fit affirmatio vel negatio, 
scilicet si addatur ei verbum.” See also: In I Peri., l. 3 (Leon. 1.18:13). Garrigou-Lagrange, 
The Sense of Mystery, 48: “As regards judgment, the verb is the very soul of the judgment.”
43. Garrigou-Lagrange calls both “to have” and “to be” “fundamental verbs,” and is 
rather ambiguous about what he means by this (Ibid., 49). 
44. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.28:22): “Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum EST consig-
nificat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti.”
45. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.27:19): “Unde Porphyrius aliter exposuit quod hoc ipsum 
ens non significat naturam alicuius rei, sicut hoc nomen homo vel sapiens, sed solum des-
ignat quamdam coniunctionem . . . Sed neque hoc convenienter videtur dici: quia si non 
significaret aliquam rem, sed solum coniunctionem, non esset neque nomen, neque verbum, 
sicut nec praepositiones aut coniunctiones.” See also In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.28:22).
46. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.28:22): “Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum EST consignifi-
cat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim 
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primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam EST, simpliciter 
dictum, significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi. Quia vero actualitas, quam 
principaliter significat hoc verbum EST, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus 
substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel 
actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum EST, vel simpliciter 
vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem 
secundum alia tempora.”
47. In I Peri., l. 2 (Leon. 1.79–80:2). Cf. Note 26.
48. DV, q. 21, a. 1, co. (Leon. 22.592–3:90–135): “tripliciter potest aliquid super 
alterum addere: uno modo quod addat aliquam rem quae sit extra essentiam illius rei cui 
dicitur addi, sicut album addit aliquid super corpus. . . . Alio modo dicitur aliquid addere 
super alterum per modum contrahendi et determinandi, sicut homo addit aliquid super 
animal, non quidem ita quod sit in homine aliqua res quae sit penitus extra essentiam an-
imalis, alias operteret dicere quod non totum quod est homo esset animal sed animal esset 
pars hominis; sed animal per hominem contrahitur quia id quod determinate et actualiter 
continetur in ratione hominis, implicite et quasi potentialiter continetur in ratione animalis 
. . . nulla enim res naturae est quae sit extra essentiam entis universalis quamvis aliqua res 
sit extra essentiam huius entis. Secundo autem modo inveniuntur aliqua addere super ens 
quia ens contrahitur per decem genera, quorum unumquodque addit aliquid super ens, 
non quidem aliquod accidens vel aliquam differentiam quae sit extra essentiam entis sed 
determinatum modum essendi qui fundatur in ipsa existentia rei.”
49. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.27:19): “ens non dicitur proprie aequivoce, sed secundum 
prius et posterius; unde simpliciter dictum intelligitur de eo, quod per prius dicitur.” See 
also In IV Metaphysicorum, l. 1, 536; cf. ibid., l. 2, 555.
50. Some authors have thought that there were languages, such as Russian, without 
any copulative “is.” E.g., Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 192, 195. This could make 
the existential sense of “is” (if there is an existential sense) more familiar than the copulative 
sense. Aquinas himself was familiar with authors who abolished the copula, and he rejected 
their theories. In I Phys., l. 4 (Leon. 2.14–15). Moreover, as Gyula Klima has pointed out, 
in languages, such as Russian and Hungarian, in which there is no spoken copula in the 
present tense, the copula is still clearly implied in the present tense inasmuch as a copula is 
needed in other tenses. Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 119.
51. This is, of course, exactly the opposite of the procedure proposed by Gilson, 
Being and Some Philosophers, 199: “To say that x is, is to say that x exercises the very first of 
all subjective acts, which is to be. The problem is not to know how is has come to signify 
existence, it is rather to know why it has been singled out to play the part of the copula.” 
I, on the other hand, think that the significance of the copula is more obvious than the 
significance of “is” as a principal predicate. So it is with the copula that we ought to begin 
any inquiry into the meaning of “being.” In any case, Thomas begins with the copula in In 
V Metaphysicorum, l. 9.
52. In V Metaphysicorum, l. 9, 890.
53. Martin, God and Explanations, 61. Brackets original.
54. In I Peri., l. 2 (Leon. 1.79–80:2).
55. Here is not the place to discuss whether the common tendency to separate Augus-
tine and Boethius from Thomas’s notion of esse is fair. But there are many cases where they use 
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the phrase “esse in rerum natura.” E.g., Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio libri tres, Opera Omnia, 
Patrologiae Latinae [=PL] Elenchus 32 (PL 32), 3.5.13: “atque ex his quatuor elementis aliae 
innumerabiles nobis, numeratae autem Deo rerum species formaeque variantur. Potest ergo 
esse aliquid in rerum natura, quod tua ratione non cogitas. Non esse autem quod vera ratione 
cogitas, non potest.” Augustine, Contra Iulianum haeresis Pelagianae defensorem libri sex, PL 44, 
6.7.20: “Bonus est oleaster in rerum natura, sed in mysteriorum scriptura malum significat; 
sicut lupi.” The citations of Patrologiae Latinae for Augustine are from www.augustinus.it/
latino. In the first quotation, Augustine contrasts how many natures there are outside the 
mind with how many we know. In the second quotation, he contrasts the goodness of sub-
stance according to its nature with its evil according to a spiritual significance imposed on it 
externally. This use of “in rerum natura” to indicate the extramental opposite of some mental 
being is also found in Boethius, Philosophiae Consolationis, in Theological Tractates, ed. G. P. 
Goold, Loeb Classical Library 74, (Edinburgh: St. Edmundsbury Press, 1973), III, c. 10, 
274:5–10: “In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquod huiusmodi bonum quale 
paulo ante definisti in rerum natura possit exsistere, ne nos praeter rei subiectae veritatem 
cassa cogitationis imago decipiat.”
56. In V Metaphysicorum, l. 9, 889–896: “Deinde cum dicit ‘secundum se’ distinguit 
modum entis per se: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per decem 
praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum. Secundo ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod 
est tantum in mente . . . —Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus comparatur ad 
primum, sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur 
veritas et falsitas in propositione.” For other instances of Thomas using “in rerum natura” 
to describe the first half of an opposition between extramental and mental being, see, DV, 
q. 1, a. 5, ad15 (Leon. 22.21:435): “. . . unde illa relation quae significatur in comparatione 
paternitatis ad subiectum non est in rerum natura sed in ratione tantum.” ScG I, c. 11 (Leon. 
13.24): “Deinde quia, dato quod ab omnibus per hoc nomen Deus intelligatur aliquid quo 
maius cogitari non possit, non necesse erit aliquid esse quo maius cogitari non potest in 
rerum natura. Eodem enim modo necesse est poni rem, et nominis rationem. Ex hoc autem 
quod mente concipitur quod profertur hoc nomine Deus, non sequitur Deum esse nisi in 
intellectu.” See also In I Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 1, co; In V Met., l. 14, 18; DV, q. 1, a. 5, ad16, 
ad17; DP, q. 3, a. 16, ad16. 
57. In IV Phys., l. 4 (Leon. 2.155).
58. In V Metaphysicorum, l. 20, 1084: “Octo autem modi essendi in aliquo in quarto 
Physicorum positi sunt . . .”
59. In IV Phys., l. 4 (Leon. 2.157): “Sciendum tamen quod aliquando dicitur aliquid 
esse in seipso, non secundum intellectum affirmativum, sicut hic reprobat Philosophus, sed 
secundum intellectum negativum, prout esse in seipso non significat nisi non esse in alio.” 
St. Thomas does not mention this sense of “in” in In Metaphysics. That’s presumably because 
it isn’t one of the basic eight senses of “in,” but is understood by reduction to those senses 
inasmuch as negations are understood by what they remove. Nevertheless, Thomas does 
address the phrases secundum se or per se in In V Metaphysicorum, l. 19. The third sense of 
secundum se in In V Metaphysics is the negation of any cause. For instance, the proposition 
“Man is man” is secundum se since no middle term causes it to be true. This is, then, a nega-
tion of the seventh sense of “in.” The fourth sense of secundum se in In V Metaphysics is that 
used to describe something that is alone or separate. This is a negation of the fifth sense of 
“in” in which a form is in matter.
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60. For Thomas’s different uses of the term natura, see: In II Phys., l. 1–2; In V Meta-
physicorum, l. 5.
61. In I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, co. (Mandonnet 555–556).
62. The view that when we say, “I am” or “Socrates is,” we are really making a negative 
judgment is popular in analytic philosophy. E.g., Davies, “Aquinas, God, and Being,” 506; 
Van Inwagen, Existence, 57–62. Cf. Note 3. Gilson criticizes a different theory in Brentano 
that, like the one at large today, has the highly implausible consequence that ostensibly 
affirmative propositions turn out to be negative ones. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 
195.
63. Someone may also try to read “esse in rerum natura” as signifying the esse that is 
in a nature or essence as in a subject. This would be the fifth sense of “in.” But the problem 
with such an interpretation is that, from the context of In I Peri., l. 2 and In V Metaphysico-
rum, l. 9, it is clear that Thomas’s word “esse,” here, refers to the concrete significate of “est.” 
The phrase “esse in rerum natura” is an abstract way of speaking about the significate of the 
concrete predicate in the sentence “Socrates is in the nature of things.” Thus, what is being 
said to be in the nature of things is not esse, but that of which esse (i.e., est) is predicated. But 
the subject of predication (i.e., Socrates) is obviously not in any nature as in a subject. So, 
“esse in rerum natura” cannot be using the fifth sense of “in.”
64. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.27:19): “Sed haec expositio non videtur conveniens, tum 
quia ens non dicitur proprie aequivoce, sed secundum prius et posterius; unde simpliciter 
dictum intelligitur de eo, quod per prius dicitur: tum etiam, quia dictio aequivoca non nihil 
significat, sed multa significat.”
65. In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.28:22): “nam EST, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse 
. . . simpliciter vel secundum quid; simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum 
quid autem secundum alia tempora.” See also: In I Peri., l. 5 (Leon. 1.25–26:12–14).
66. See Notes 55–56.
67. In V Metaphysicorum, l. 9, 889: “Primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per 
decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum. Secundo ponit alium modum entis, secun-
dum quod est tantum in mente, ibi, ‘Amplius autem et esse significat.’ Tertio dividit ens per 
potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est communius quam ens perfectum. Nam ens in 
potentia, est ens secundum quid tantum et imperfectum, ibi, ‘Amplius esse significat et ens.’”
68. Cf. In IV Metaphysicorum, l. 1, 539–540: “ita etiam et ens multipliciter dicitur. 
Sed tamen omne ens dicitur per respectum ad unum primum. Sed hoc primum non est finis 
vel efficiens sicut in praemissis exemplis, sed subiectum . . . Item negationes eorum quae ad 
substantiam habitudinem habent, vel etiam ipsius substantiae esse dicuntur. Unde dicimus 
quod non ens est non ens. Quod non diceretur nisi negationi aliquo modo esse competeret. 
Sciendum tamen quod praedicti modi essendi ad quatuor possunt reduci. Nam unum eorum 
quod est debilissimum, est tantum in ratione, scilicet negatio et privatio, quam dicimus in 
ratione esse, quia ratio de eis negociatur quasi de quibusdam entibus, dum de eis affirmat 
vel negat aliquid. Secundum quid autem differant negatio et privatio, infra dicetur.” On the 
asymmetric relation of truth to esse outside the mind, see: In V Metaphysicorum, l. 17; DV, 
q. 21, a. 1, co. An important consequence of the analogy between ens ut verum and ens extra 
animam is that ens ut verum is itself divided analogically into categories according to the 
ten genera of being that may be reflected in the mind’s conception of extramental being. 
For instance, a subject in the mind is a substance by analogy with one outside the mind. 
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If I am correct, this undercuts Klima’s reading of In V Metaphysics in which ens ut verum is 
understood as a univocal predicate.
69. In V Metaphysicorum, l. 9, 896: “Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus 
comparatur ad primum, sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura 
est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione, quam intellectus significat per hoc verbum 
est prout est verbalis copula. Sed, quia aliquid, quod est in se non ens, intellectus considerat 
ut quoddam ens, sicut negationem et huiusmodi, ideo quandoque dicitur esse de aliquo 
hoc secundo modo, et non primo. Dicitur enim, quod caecitas est secundo modo, ex eo 
quod vera est propositio, qua dicitur aliquid esse caecum; non tamen dicitur quod sit primo 
modo vera. Nam caecitas non habet aliquod esse in rebus, sed magis est privatio alicuius esse. 
Accidit autem unicuique rei quod aliquid de ipsa vere affirmetur intellectu vel voce. Nam 
res non refertur ad scientiam, sed e converso. Esse vero quod in sui natura unaquaeque res 
habet, est substantiale. Et ideo, cum dicitur, Socrates est, si ille est primo modo accipiatur, 
est de praedicato substantiali. Nam ens est superius ad unumquodque entium, sicut animal 
ad hominem. Si autem accipiatur secundo modo, est de praedicato accidentali.”
70. Cf. QDq, IX, q. 2, a. 3, co. (Leon. 25.96:50–52).
71. By saying this, I do not mean to suggest that “esse in rerum natura” and “esse sub-
stantiale” are synonymous. But adequately distinguishing them would require an extensive 
digression into the derivative sense in which predicamental accidents can be said to have a 
substance or essence. Cf. In VII Metaphysicorum, l. 1–4; De ente, c. 6.
72. Cf. Note 28, where I give additional arguments against the view that “esse acci-
dentale” should be understood as accidental existence.
73. Brock, “How Many Acts,” 320 and 325n27.
74. In hebd., c. 2 (22–24:150–190).
75. See: McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas, 192 and 207–209.
76. In III De Anima, c. 2 (Leon. 45.210:125): “aliud est magnitudo et magnitudini 
esse, id est aliud magnitudo et quod quid est eius (esse enim quod est magnitudini appellat 
quiditatem eius), et similiter aliud est aqua et aque esse et sic in multis aliis, id est in omnibus 
mathematicis et naturalibus; unde signanter duo exempla posuit, nam magnitude est quid 
mathematicum, aqua autem est quid naturale.”
77. In VII Metaphysicorum, l. 3, 1310: “in omnibus sequentibus per hoc quod dicit 
hoc esse, vel huic esse, intelligit quod quid erat esse illius rei; sicut homini esse vel hominem 
esse, intelligit id quod pertinet ad quod quid est homo. Quod est autem ‘musicum esse,’ 
idest hoc ipsum quod quid est musicus, non pertinet ad hoc quod quid es tu.”
78. It becomes more complicated to determine whether Thomas uses “esse hominem” 
and “esse substantiale” to signify esse essentiae or esse existentiae in his Christological treatises. 
He does deny that esse hominem is the esse simpliciter of Christ whereas in other texts Aquinas 
identifies esse simpliciter with esse substantiale. Cf. ST III, q. 16, a. 9, co; ST III, q. 16, a. 6, 
ad1. But, even in making this unusual denial, Aquinas simultaneously implies that the reverse 
is the case in normal creatures. For Thomas, “esse substantiale” may still mean essence, but 
because of the idiosyncrasies of Christ’s supernatural unity, “esse substantiale” is too coarse a 
term. Thomas no longer distinguishes just esse substantiale and esse accidentale, but instead 
esse substantiale principale, esse substantiale secundum quid, and esse accidentale. De unione 
Verbi, q. 4, co. All interpreters of this text from De Unione have assumed Thomas uses “esse 
substantiale” to signify esse existentiae. These interpreters may well be right in the context 
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of this article, and I do not intend to defend a contrary interpretation here. For various 
interpretations of De Unione, a. 4—a text which superficially seems to contradict parallel 
texts—see Osborne, “Which Essence,” esp. 502–505; Victor Salas, “Thomas Aquinas on 
Christ’s Esse: A Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” The Thomist 70. 4 (2006): 577–603; J.L.A. 
West, “Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ,” The Thomist 66.2 (2002): 231–250.
79. ST I–II, q. 18, a. 1, co: “Sic igitur dicendum est quod omnis actio, inquantum 
habet aliquid de esse, intantum habet de bonitate, inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de 
plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni humanae, intantum deficit a bonitate.”
80. That accidents signified abstractly are signified in the mode of substance, see In V 
Metaphysicorum, l. 9, 894; De Virtutibus, q. 1, a. 11, co: “formae per modum substantiarum 
signantur in abstracto, ut albedo, vel virtus.”
81. In VII Metaphysicorum, l. 4, 1355: “definitio quae est ratio eius quod quid erat esse, 
et ipsum quod quid erat esse, solum est substantiarum, sicut prima solutio habebat. Vel est 
primo et simpliciter earum, et per posterius et secundum quid accidentium, ut in secunda 
solutione dicebatur.”
82. In II Script., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, co. (Mandonnet 872): “Philosophus, in V Metaphys., 
text. 14, ostendit quod ens multipliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo dicitur ens quod per decem 
genera dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in natura existens, sive sit substantia, ut homo, 
sive accidens, ut color. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis . . . 
Quæcumque ergo dicuntur entia quantum ad primum modum, sunt entia quantum ad 
secundum modum: quia omne quod habet naturale esse in rebus potest significari per prop-
ositionem affirmativam esse, ut cum dicitur: color est vel homo est . . . secundum primum 
modum acceptum est prædicatum substantiale, et pertinet ad quæstionem quid est.”
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